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We investigate the empirical evidence of the „textbook theory“ of 
minimum wages for the Austrian Industry. The bargaining result of un-
ions and firms is interpreted as a minimum wage, as the bargaining 
situation in Austria may be described best by a „right to manage“ 
model“. Based on the analysis of micro-founded „employment func-
tions“ in contrast to the predictions of the „textbook analysis“ no sig-
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In this paper we investigate the empirical evidence of minimum wages in the Austrian In-
dustry.
1 We are interested in the explanatory power of the traditional partial-analytic and com-
parative-static „textbook analysis“ which states that minimum wages should reduce employ-
ment (see e.g. Borjas 1999, 140).  
The question is interesting from two different points of view. First, in Austria a minimum 
wage floor for almost every industry is implemented by collective bargaining. From an eco-
nomic point of view these wage floors should imply identical employment effects as a legal 
minimum wage. Moreover, in international comparison the coverage rate in the Austrian indus-
try is extremely high, supposing high minimum wage effects. 
Second, in the newer literature the predictions of the “textbook-theory” are criticized both 
from an empirical and a theoretical point of view. In contrast to older empirical results (see 
Brown, Gilroy and Cohen 1982 for an overview), recent studies often find no or even positive 
employment effects of minimum wages.
2 Given perfect competition on the labor market, the 
“textbook-model” states that a binding minimum wage reduces employment. However, in the 
monopsony case employment could also increase. The newer literature points out that mo-
nopsony power not only exists in the “one-firm”-case, but in each case when a firm faces an 
upward sloping supply curve for labor (see Boal and Ransom 1997 for an overview). This 
situation is much more probable than the “one-firm”-case and could be a reason for the unex-
pected empirical results.
3 Moreover, in contrast to the partial-analytic and comparative-static 
analysis, newer theoretical studies analyze the effects of minimum wages in a dynamic setting 
(Cahuc and Michel 1996, Raven and Sorenson 1995 and 1999, Ragacs 2002). Focusing on 
externalities in human capital formation minimum wages could internalize parts of the external 
effects yielding increased skills accumulation inducing higher economic growth, and in some 
models even increased employment. 
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a description of the Austrian bar-
gaining system. In section 3 we derive „warranted“ employment equations following from the 
“textbook-theory”. After a description of the used data set, we test for the possibility to esti-
mate these equations directly in section 4. In particular, we test for deterministic trend- and 
stochastic stationarity and for co-integration.
4 These tests result in the necessity to partly adopt 
the „warranted“ equations for statistical reasons. In section 5 the estimation results are pre-
sented. At last concluding remarks close the paper. 
2. Collective Bargaining in Austria 
In Austria, minimum wages are the result of collective bargains between labor unions and 
entrepreneurs associations. These bargains are characterized by a central organization struc-
ture of the labor unions. Even though the negotiations are carried out by many different labor 
unions existing for most of the economic branches, the Austrian Trade Union Federation 
                                                 
1 For the effects of aggregated average wages in the Austrian case see Thury (1990). 
2 See e.g. Neumark und Wascher (2000) and Card und Krueger (2000) as examples for the newer discussion 
and  OECD 1998 and Ghellap 1998 for an overview. 
3 The discussion started with publications of Card and Krueger (1994, 1995). 




(Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) as central union organization has to permit these bar-
gains. Additionally, in most cases there exists a strong organizational link between the Austrian 
Trade Union Federation and the sectoral unions.
5  
The negotiations are carried out in an informal framework, not only the labor union and the 
entrepreneurs associations are involved, but also other important groups which are mainly 
based on legal foundations („Wirtschaftsverbände“, in specific different „chambers“), and, 
without vote, the government, too. After a bargaining result is reached, the state gives legal 
approval by the court. Hence the contracts are supported by law. Contracts are negotiated for 
specific industries and working types. They are valid for all workers who belong to these spe-
cific criteria and not only for the union´s members. Although the union density rate in the Euro-
pean context is on average (about 40 percent, see Charley 2002, table 2), in Austria such 
contracts exist for almost all parts of the private economy, in particular for the Austrian indus-
try, leading to a coverage rate of nearly 98 percent (Carley 2003, Table 3). However, in inter-
national comparison the proportion of workers paid the minimum wage is small (about 4 per-
cent, see Dolado et. al. 1996, table 1) and the unemployment rate is low (2001: 3.6 percent, 
see WKÖ 2003). 
 The negotiations mostly take place every year or less and concern a bundle of industry 
specific contracts. Topics are working time, working conditions and wages, but not employ-
ment as an element of the contract. Therefore for the empirical analysis of the Austrian case 
we may interpret the negotiated wage as a minimum wage, because from the theoretical point 
of view the bargaining situation is described best by a „right to manage“ model, yielding bar-
gaining results conforming to the traditional demand curve for labor. 
The negotiations cover different type of wages. Most important are the tariff wages 
(„Kollektivvertragslöhne“) which set the basic wage floor. From an economic point of view 
they are identical to legal minimum wages. A second and very Austrian specific aim of the ne-
gotiations is to set a minimum growth rate for all wages that are higher than the minimum wages 
(„Istlöhne“). In addition to the centralized bargains, often also decentral wage bargains at the 
firm’s level exist, leading to overpayments either of the minimum wage or of the „Istlohn“. 
Hence the actual growth rates of many wages are higher than the results of the central bargain-
ing indicate. However, we find a high correlation between minimum and average wages.  
Moreover, there exist specific wage regulations for apprentices. From an economic point 
of view these regulations may be interpreted as a maximum rather than a minimum wage. 
Given apprentice numbers with about 50 Percent of the birthrate (WKÖ 2003), in interna-
tional comparison we would expect a relatively small effect of minimum wages on youth em-
ployment. 
In spite of the central organizational structure of the Austrian labor union, we find high in-
tersectoral wage differentials in the Austrian industry (Hofer 1992). Even the minimum wages 
of the industries and for specific job categories are different. However, a central implicit aim of 
the labor union traditionally was a high level of employment. Accordingly the macroeconomic 
situation very often had important influence on the results of the wage bargains, leading to anti-
cyclical wage settings. This is not in contrast to the „right to manage“ behavior of the union and 
                                                 




may be interpreted as the outcome of a bargaining situation where the union values employ-
ment much more than wages.  
Summing up, for the empirical analysis of the Austrian case four stylized facts are most 
important: An extremely high coverage rate, bargaining even in the high-wage sector, high cor-
relation between minimum and average wages, and an exclusion for apprentices. 
3. Employment Functions 
Following the partial-analytic textbook analysis of minimum wages, the implementation of 
minimum wages creates labor market distortions which ceteris paribus cause negative em-
ployment effects. Based on the idea of profit maximization in a partial-analytic framework, in 
the following „employment functions“ with employment as a function of the minimum wage and 
other economic control variables, will be derived.
6 Furthermore, we assume that there exist 
economic frictions, which allow only for partial adjustment towards the optimal level of labor. 
Given the high correlation between minimum and average wages, the high coverage rate, bar-
gaining even in the high-wage sector, the high correlation between minimum and average 
wages, and an exclusion for apprentices, for the empirical analysis we use the minimum wage 
and aggregate employment for estimation. Hence we do not distinguish between different 
forms of labor and wages. For the same reason for the estimations we directly use the mini-
mum wage and not the Kaitz-Index which in other empirical studies is often used. 
According to the „textbook analysis“ we assume perfect competition on the labor and 
goods market. The production function is to be of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
type, or: 
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Yt describes output,  Lt labor (employed persons),  Kt the capital stock, and d  the weight of 
the factors of production.
7  At represents exogenous technological progress.  m  is a substitu-
tion parameter defining different special forms of the CES production function, like that of a 
Cobb-Douglas, linear or Leontiev type.  s m = + ) 1 /( 1 , where  s  describes the elasticity of 
substitution between the factors of production.  
The number of the identical firms is normalized to one. Firms maximize profits, p t. Based 
on a „right to manage model“, they first negotiate with the union about the nominal wage, and 
then they unilaterally choose the optimal level of employment. Hence for the labor demand 
decision firms take the wage as given ( t w ).
8  Due to the assumptions employment is deter-
mined by the factor demand function. Hence for the analysis we do not have to take labor 
supply into account. Good prices, Pt, , and capital costs, r t  are exogenous. The profit function 
is given by: 
  t t t t t t t t t K r L w K L A P - - - + =
-
- - m m m d d p
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6 See Ragacs (1993). 
7 Note that the implementation of working hours would be a straightforward extension. However, addition-
ally use of working hours did not qualitatively change the regression results. Therefore we omit this 
variable. 
8 Given this setting we do not have to define a specific utility function of the union. It only has to be a 




and the respective FOC for labor is given by: 
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The right hand side of this equation partially is identical to the production function. Substitute 
by equation (1), denote the real minimum wage by  mt and reformulate to yield that 
1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (  
- - - + - + - + =
m m m m d t t t t m Y A L . At last, we substitute by  s  to obtain the optimal demand 
for labor which turns out as: 
  L A Ym t t t t =
- - d
s ms s   , where s m = +
- ( ) 1
1.  (4) 
As to be seen the demand for labor is determined by the weight of labor in the production 
process, technological progress, output and the level of the real minimum wage.  
Taking logarithms of equation (4) yields that  ln ln ln ln ln L A Y m t t t t = - + - s d ms s
  . 
Denoting the OLS-coefficients by  b i,  s d ln  by „ con“, and  ms ln At by „ trend“, and the 
residuals by  t e , the following equation directly may be estimated: 
  t t t t m Y trend con L e b b b + + + + = ln ln ln 2 1 0 .  (5) 
The supposed signs of the estimated parameters are given by  con > 0,  0 b < 0,  b1 0 > , and 
b2 0 < .  b1 = 1 and - b2 directly can be interpreted as s .  
Remember, that from the theoretical point of view we analyzed a closed economy. How-
ever, for the empirical analysis introducing output into the labor demand function as is done in 
equation 5 helps to indirectly capture effects of international business cycles.  
Next, we assume that due to economic rigidities yielding adjustment problems, the optimal 
demand for labor differs from the actual one. There exists a partially adjustment process to-
wards the optimal level of labor. It follows that in each point in time there is a gap between the 
optimal and the actual level of labor. Let  Lt
* describe the optimal level of employment which is 
expressed by equation (4), and  Lt the actual one. The parameter t  describes the extend of 
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Substitution by  Lt
* from equation (4),  taking logarithms and reformulation yields that: 
























.  (7) 
Rearranging leads to two equations which may be interpreted better for economic purposes.
9 
We obtain that  t t t t t t m L Y Y A L ln ) ln( ln ln ln   ln
1
1 1 ts t t tms d s t - + D + - = D
-
- - ,  
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1
1 1 ln ln ) ln( ln ln ln   ln -
-
- - + - + D + - = t t t t t t t L m L Y Y A L ts t t tms d s t . 
Denoting the OLS-coefficients by  b i,  t s d   ln  by „con“,  tms ln At by „trend“, the rate 
of growth of employment by gL, the rate of growth of output by gY and the lagged labor pro-
ductivity by  prodt-1, the following functions will be estimated:  
  t t t Y L m prod trend con e b b g b b g + + + + + = - ln ln 3 1 2 1 0 ,   (8) 
  t t t t Y t L m prod trend con L e b b b g b b + + + + + + = - - 1 4 3 1 2 1 0 ln ln ln ln .  (9) 
                                                 




Equation (8) states that the rate of growth of employment is a function of a constant, a time 
trend, the growth rate of output, lagged labor productivity and the real minimum wage. Equa-
tion (9) states that the level of employment is a function of identical variables as described by 
equation (8) and additionally of lagged employment in levels. The signs of the estimated pa-
rameters are supposed to be,  con > 0,  0 b  <  0,  b b 1 2 0 = > ,  b3 0 < , and  b 4 0 > . The 
mathematical rearrangement to obtain equations (8) and (9) implies that  b1 =b 2. Hence the 
OLS estimations were carried out with this restriction.  b1 and  b 2 describe the parameter for 
partial adjustment,t  and  b 4 should be identical to one. 
4. Used Data Set and Time Series Properties 
The estimations are based on aggregated data for the Austrian industry. We have to re-
strict our analysis to yearly data, because on average wage bargainings take place yearly. For 
the minimum wage we used the Austrian „Tariflohnindex“, published by the „Österreichischem 
Statistischen Zentralamt“ (OESTAT). The goods price in our simple model is the price for 
consumer goods, therefore we used the consumer price index, published by the Austrian Insti-
tute of Economic Research (WIFO).
10 The two existing time series, based on the years 1976 
and 1983 were joined for one series based in the year 1976. Employment is given by average 
industry employment (with exception of some minor branches), published by OESTAT. At 
last, output of the industry is real output based on the year 1976, achieved by joining two real 
time series, based on the years 1976 and 1983, which also are published by OESTAT. All 
data are taken from the database of WIFO and are to be found in the appendix. 
Time horizon and number of observations of the analysis were restricted by the availability 
of the data. For all time series we only yield data for the period from 1967 till 1995. Because 
of data problems due to a change in the statistical classification in accordance with Austria’s 
joining to the European Union no newer comparable data exist. All OLS estimates were per-
formed with the statistical software packages „RATS“ and „EVIEWS“. 
Figure 1 gives a first impression of the time series properties. It shows the log-differenced 
values (the rates of growth) for employment, real minimum wage, output and productivity for 
the Austrian industry. 
                                                 




Figure 1, Employment, Real Minimum Wage, Output and Productivity. 
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At a first look productivity seems to be stationary. Minimum wages, employment and out-
put seem to exhibit a trend even after differencing at least for some sub-periods of the sample.  
We are interested in the estimation of economic relations based on standard theoretical 
reasoning. However, due to statistical properties of the time series, it is possible that it is not 
admissible to estimate these relationships directly. In particular, estimating ordinary least 
squared (OLS) estimations of nonstationary variables (involving a time trend) would yield spu-
rious regression results. Nonexisting correlations would be reported due to the existence of 
time trends (Gujarati 1995, 724 f.). In general, time trends may follow a stochastic or a ran-
dom process, or they may be deterministic. In the case of the existence of a deterministic time 
trend the implementation of an additional independent trend variable would help to generate 
stationarity. In the case of a stochastic behavior, differencing of the time series would be an 
appropriate method for reaching the same aim. We focus on the cases  ) 0 ( I  and  ) 1 ( I  (see 
appendix). 
To test for stochastic stationarity we use the Dickey Fuller (DF) and the augmented 
Dickey fuller test (ADF) (see appendix). The advantage of the ADF- in contrast to the simple 
DF-test is that it may correct for autocorrelation of the residuals which would lead to inefficient 
estimates (Charemza and Deadman 1997, 104 f.). The tests may be adopted by different 
combinations of included or excluded constant terms or deterministic time trends, allowing for 
simultaneous testing for deterministic and stochastic stationarity. To determine the order of 
integration, we calculated the DF- and the ADF-tests on the one hand including a constant and 




differences of the logarithmic time series. In the following table we present the test results if 
significant at the five percent level. 
Table 1, DF and ADF Tests for Stationarity 
1a: Stationarity in Levels, t-values 
Expl. Variable  DF(1)  ADF(2)  ADF(3)  ADF(4)  ADF(5)  ADF(6) 
m constant  -2.98  -  -  -  -  - 
     DW  1.73           
m constant trend 













     DW        2.38  2.21  2.00 
L constant  -  -  -  -  -  - 
     DW             
L constant trend 













     DW  1.21  1.63  1.88  2.07  2.11  1.99 
Y constant  -3.19  -  -2.11  -  -  - 
     DW  2.01    0.83       
A constant trend 
    Significance of trend 



















Y/L constant  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Y/L constant trend 













     DW  2.20  2.12  2.01  2.11  2.14  2.00 
 
1b: Stationarity in Differences, t-values 
Expl. Variable  DF(1)  ADF(2)  ADF(3)  ADF(4)  ADF(5)  ADF(6) 
m constant  -4.10  -3.45  -  -  -  - 
     DW  2.07  1.79         
m constant trend 













     DW  2.00  1.75         
L constant  -  -3.98  -  -     
     DW    1.91         
L constant trend 













     DW    1.93         
Y constant  -4.08  -3.46  -  -  -3.12  -3.37 
     DW  1.96  2.16      2.16  2.31 
Y constant trend 













     DW  1.87  2.10         
Y/L constant  -6.07  -4.76  -4.01  -3.81  -3.94  -3.96 
     DW  2.09  2.17  2.08  2.09  2.17  2.31 
Y/L constant trend 













     DW  2.07  2.17  2.09       
The table provides the t-statistics for the lagged dependent variable if significant at the five 
percent level. Critical values are presented in the statistical appendix. 
Variables are employment (L), real minimum wage (m), real output (Y) and real labor productiv-
ity (Y/L); logarithms. 
(A)DF: (Augmented) Dickey Fuller test. AR coefficients are written in brackets. DW: Durbin 





Analyzing only the results for the differenced time series, the decision for detrending would 
be clear. The DF and the ADF tests show that differencing of the time series would lead to 
stationarity and we find no indication for trend-stationarity for any of the four time series. 
However, the results of the tests for levels of the time series disturb this clear point of view. 
The test statistics for the minimum indicate autocorrelation, and for the other time series we 
find indication for trend- and stochastic stationarity in all cases where the DW-statistics does 
not indicate autocorrelation. Hence we do not yield a clear decision rule for detrending of the 
time series. This leads to two consequences. First, we will estimate the „warranted“ equations 
(5), (8) and (9) with differenced and not differenced time series. A time trend has to be im-
plemented in any case because of our theoretical derivation of the equations. Second, for the 
use of differenced time series, we additionally test for co-integration.  
Co-integration of time series which are difference stationary would give rise to the possi-
bility of relationships between the two variables in levels even if there exist no relationships 
between the two variables in differences (see appendix). This would imply spurious regression 
results and the impossibility of the estimation of the „warranted“ estimation equations without 
correction by an „error-correction term“ capturing the adjustment process towards the long 
run equilibrium (Gujarati 1995, 728 f.). Testing for co-integration we use the „Engle-Granger 
Procedure“ (see appendix). In the following table we present the DF and ADF tests (including 
a constant term) for co-integration. 
Table 2, DF and ADF Tests for Co-Integration for Equation 5, 8 and 9´ 
 
Equation  N  Critical Values 
(5%) 
DF(1)  ADF(2)  ADF(3)  ADF(4)  ADF(5) 




































The table provides the t-statistic for the lagged dependent variable. Values for the Durbin Wat-
son-Statistic are indicated in smaller numbers. The critical values follow Charezma and Deadman 
(1997, 292 ff.), and show estimated lower and upper limits for the given number of observations; 
with constant; minus sign omitted. 
DF: Dickey Fuller test, ADF: Augmented Dickey Fuller test. AR coefficients are written in brack-
ets after the DF and ADF indication. N: Number of usable observations for DF(1), this number is 
reduced by the additional lags of the ADF tests. 
 
For equations 8 and 9 we definitely do not find co-integrating relationships and therefore 
there is no need for the implementation of an error-correction term for the ongoing analysis. 
For equation (5) the DF(1) test is not clear because the critical values provided by Charezma 
and Deadman (1997) are only available for 25 or 30 observations. 
5. Estimation Results 
We remember all equations for estimation which were derived from economic theory. They 
are given by equations (5), (8) and (9). Furthermore, we substitute for the variables in levels 




new equations by a quotation mark. The OLS-results are to be seen in table 3 where the 
lower case indication of  g  describes the rate of growth of the respective variables and (t-1) 
denotes the lagged time period.  
 
Table 3, Basic Regressions Results (OLS) 
3a: „Warranted“ Equations 
Eq.  Dep. 
Var. 
  Con  Trend  Output  gY  Y/L 
(t-1) 











    0.20 
 0.12 
  1.13  0.98 










  1.35  0.87 












1.35  0.99 
 
3b:  „Warranted“ Equations With Differenced Independent Variables 
Eq.  Dep. 
Var. 
  Con  Trend  gY  g (Y/L)(t-1)  gm  gL(-1)  DW
*)  A.R
2 






  -0.0 
0.87 
  1.59  0.60 










  1.20  0.77 












1.30  0.77 
Variables are employment (L), lagged employment (L(t-1)), the rate of growth of employment 
(gL), real output (Y), the rate of growth of real output (gY), real lagged labor productivity (Y/L 
(t-1)), the rate of growth of real lagged labor productivity (g (Y/L) (t-1)), real minimum wages (m), 
and the rate or growth of real minimum wages (gm). 
DW: Durbin Watson d-test if no autoregressive term exists. *) The DW-d-test yields a build-
in bias to against discovering first order correlation in the case of autoregressive variables 
(equations 9 and 9´) (Gujarati 1995, 420f.). However, in spite of this bias the DW-statistic 
indicates autocorrelation, so there is no need for using a better test statistic. 
Estimations by OLS, annual logarithmic data from 1967 to 1995, linear time trend, p-values are 




Finding indication for autocorrelation from a statistical point of view all estimates of our 
“warranted equations” are problematic. Therefore the results are not discussed from the eco-
nomic point of view. To correct for autocorrelation we added up to three AR-lags of the de-
pendent variables and, because we do not know the exact form of autocorrelation, we used 
the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative method.
11 However, with exception of equation (5´) these at-
tempts did not help to solve the statistical problems. The results of the adopted equation (5´) 
will be presented later in table (5). Furthermore, remember that we found no clear indication 
for the existence of co-integration for equation (5´). Therefore additionally we estimated this 
equation with additional error correction. However, the estimation result did not change quali-
tatively, hence we do not present the results. 
                                                 




A reason for these statistical problems could be found in the existence of structural 
breaks, meaning that the whole time period should be separated in sub-periods where either 
the intercepts, the coefficients and/or the intercepts and coefficients are distinct. Hence we 
tested for structural breaks using the Chow-Test for structural stability (see appendix). We 
calculated the Chow-test for all possible years for all equations. In the following table we show 
all years where the test statistics are significant at the five percent level. 
Table 4, Chow Breakpoint Test:  
Significant Structural Breaks at the Five Percent Level 
Equation  1977  1980  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 
5  -  -  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
8  -  -  x  x  -  -  -  -  -  - 
9  -  -  x  x  x  -  x  x  x  - 
5´  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
8´  -  -  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  - 
9´  x  x  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Estimations by OLS, annual data from 1967 to 1995. Significant breaks at the five percent 
level are marked with an x. The calculations were carried out for all possible years. 
With exception of equation (5´) the Chow-Test indicates structural breaks for all esti-
mated equations and therefore we have to split the time range of the estimations even if the 
number of observations is limited by the availability of data.
12 Hence in the following we esti-
mated equations (5), (8), (9), and (8´) within the two subsamples from 1967 to 1983 and 
from 1984 until 1995 and equation (9´) within the subsamples 1967 to 1979 and 1980 until 
1995. In many cases we obtained the problem of autocorrelation even in the subsamples. In 
this case we corrected by up to three AR-lags. 
In the following table the estimations of the subsamples of the time horizon are presented 
in any case, but we present the results of the estimations with AR-corrections only if the esti-
mation improved the results from the statistical point of view. Hence the existence of AR-lags 
in the estimated equations may be founded by two reasons. First, it may be the result of the 
derivation of the estimated equations, and second it may be implemented in order to correct 
for autocorrelation. In the later case this fact is marked in the table. At last, the results of the 
estimation of equation (5´), which does not exhibit a structural break, are provided too. 
                                                 
12 We do not discuss this result from the economic point of view because in this paper we only are inter-




Table 5, Regressions Results (OLS) with Structural Breaks and AR-Corrections 



















yes  0.10 
 (BG) 
0.98 






-  -  1.65 
0.00 
-  -  2.63  
(DW) 
0.98 










-  -  1.90  
(DW) 
0.93 










-  -  2.45  
(DW) 
0.86 












-  0.10  
(BG) 
0.98 
















 5b: „Warranted“ Equations With Differenced Variables 
Eq.  Years  Dep. 
Var. 
















-  yes  0.21 (BG)  0.82 










-  -  -  1.06 
(DW) 
0.85 














yes  0.15 (BG)  0.88 












-  -  0.45 (BG)  0.91 












-  -  0.40 (BG)  0.88 
Variables are employment (L), the rate of growth of employment (gL), real output (Y), the rate of growth of 
real output (gY), real lagged labor productivity ((Y/L)(t-1)), the rate of growth of real lagged labor produc-
tivity (g(Y(/L)(t-1)), real minimum wages (m), the rate or growth of real minimum wages (gm). AR-Cor.: Addi-
tional AR-correction, presented only if it improved the estimation from the statistical point of view.  
Years: Time horizon for estimation, ignoring a reduction in the number of observations by lagged vari-
ables.  
DW: Durbin Watson d-test if no autoregressive term exists, BG: Breusch-Godfrey test if autoregressive 
terms exists (estimated with two lags), p-values. DW and BG-values which do not indicate autocorrela-
tion at the five percent or 10 level are marked in italics.  
The respective p-values are indicated by smaller numbers. A.R
2: Adjusted R
2. 
Estimations by OLS, annual logarithmic data from 1967 to 1995, linear time trend. 
 
Equations 5a), 5b), 8b), 9a) und 9b) are (at least with additional AR-correction) statisti-
cally not problematic.
13 They are marked in italics. Asking for the impact of the level of real 
minimum wages we definitely find no statistically significant negative effect of real minimum 
wages, neither on the level of employment nor on the rate of growth of employment. More-
over, for equation (5) for the time period 1984 till 1995, we find a significant positive effect of 
the level of minimum wages on the level of employment. Looking at the impact of the rate of 
growth of minimum wages, we achieve a very similar picture. For none of the statistically not 
                                                 




problematic estimations the rate of growth of minimum wages exhibits a significant negative 
effect on the rate of growth of employment.  
6. Discussion of the Results 
We interpreted the bargaining result of unions and firms as minimum wage, because this 
bargaining situation may be described best by a „right to manage“ model“ yielding results con-
forming to the standard labor demand function of the firm. Based on the analysis of micro-
based „employment functions” we investigated the explanatory power of the traditional „text-
book analysis“ and found no significant negative effect of minimum wages on employment. This 
result is in contrast to the predictions of the „textbook-model“ of minimum wages. However, it 
could be based on four different reasons: 
§  The results could suggest other forms of the organization of the labor market and ef-
fects of minimum wages as is maintained by perfect competition and comparative stat-
ics. On the one hand, firms could exhibit some kind of market (monopsony) power, on 
the other hand indirect output effects of minimum wages could offset negative em-
ployment effects as is suggested by the new dynamic oriented theoretical models. 
§  Without possibility to compare the minimum wage with the „equilibrium wage“, it is not 
possible to capture the wage differential between the „equilibrium“ and the minimum 
wage. Hence it is simple possible that the wage differential is very slight, inducing only 
marginal economic impact on employment. This also could be a possible interpretation 
for the insignificance of most of the empirical estimations. This argument is supported 
by the strong anticyclical wage setting behavior of the Austrian Labor union and the 
considerable intersectoral wage differentials reflecting productivity oriented wage set-
tings. 
§  Moreover, an existing negative employment effect of the minimum wage could simply 
be so small, that it is overruled by aggregation effects.  
§  At last, we have to mention, that due to the estimated structural breaks, the necessary 
restriction of our analysis to yearly data and the lack of long time series, the number of 
observations used for the estimations is very small inducing possible estimation failures.  
Summing up the results for Austria confirm the newer unclear or even positive outcomes 
of many of the newer empirical studies. Further research will focus on the effects of minimum 
wages on the disaggregated level.  
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Used Data Set 
Year  Minimum Wages  Employment  Output  Productivity 
1967  1.836  601126  97801  16.27 
1968  0.930  591112  103812  17.56 
1969  1.009  609481  116454  19.11 
1970  1.008  629026  126697  20.14 
1971  1.086  643268  134911  20.97 
1972  1.192  658189  144749  21.99 
1973  1.293  671087  152808  22.77 
1974  1.306  667871  158889  23.79 
1975  1.412  633734  147253  23.24 
1976  1.500  623888  158136  25.35 
1977  1.542  628584  165063  26.26 
1978  1.615  617686  167687  27.15 
1979  1.614  614954  179534  29.19 
1980  1.592  621600  185455  29.84 
1981  1.595  607929  185053  30.44 
1982  1.625  582960  184450  31.64 
1983  1.667  558935  186532  33.37 
1984  1.641  555400  192152  34.60 
1985  1.712  556399  199353  35.83 
1986  1.771  552343  202533  36.67 
1987  1.843  536708  200369  37.33 
1988  1.873  525455  213931  40.71 
1989  1.886  529129  223467  42.23 
1990  1.954  537299  233787  43.51 
1991  2.053  531340  236910  44.59 
1992  2.100  512724  237632  46.35 
1993  2.136  479470  228798  47.72 
1994  2.161  462246  238402  51.62 
1995  2.199  457537  247006  53.99 
Real minimum wages: Calculated from the Austrian „Tariflohnindex“, published by OESTAT, and the CPI, 
published by WIFO; original series based on the years 1966, 1976 and 1983, joint by own calculation based 
on the year 1976. Employment: average employment (with exception of some minor branches), published 
by OESTAT. Output: real output, original series published by WIFO, based on the years 1976 and 1983, 
joint by own calculation based on the year 1976; in million Austrian Schillings. Labor productivity: Own 
calculation. All data for the Austrian Industry, aggregated for yearly data if necessary. Source: Database 
of WIFO (Time series indication: CPI: NPDCQS, NPDCQ8S; Minimum Wages: YTTBBS, YNIBBS, Employ-
ment: ABIA6M, Output: NWIIMR, NWIIM8R). 
Integration, Stationarity and Co-integration 
A „series with no deterministic component which has a stationary, invertible, ARMA representation after 
differencing d times, is said to be integrated of order  d , denoted  y I d
t ~ ( ) “ (Engle and Granger 1987, 
252). In our case we focus on the cases  I( ) 0  and  I( ) 1 . If µ describes the arithmetic mean and t k  is an 
autocovariance function of the process  yt , then a „stochastic process  yt  is stationary, if, i.  [ ] E yt   = m  
or all t. ii.  var( ) yt < ¥  for all t . iii.  [ ] cov( , ) ( )( ) y y E y y t t k t t k k + + = - - =     m m t  for all t  and k .“ (Judge, 
Hill, Griffiths, Lütkepohl, Lee 1988, 679). „The components of a vector x are Co-integrated of order d,b, 
denoted x, if (i) all components of x are  I d ( ) ; (ii) there exists a vector  ( ) a = 0  so that: zt=a´x ~ I(d,b), 
b > 0. The vector a is called the Co-integrating vector.“ (Engle and Granger 1987, 253). If the time series are 
I(1) and the linear combination of the time series is I(0), the time series are said to be Co-integrated of order 
one (CI(1,1)). 
DF and ADF-Tests 
An AR process of order one (AR1) with white noise residuals e t , is given by  y y
t t t = + +
- b b e




This process is stationary if  b 2 1 < . If the coefficient is identical to one, we would face an unit root-
problem, hence the time series would follow a random walk and would be nonstationary. Transforming 
leads to the test regression for the „Dickey Fuller Test“ which turns out as  Dy y
t t t = + - +
- b b e
1 2 1 1 ( ) . 
The null hypothesis is (b
2 1 0 - = )  meaning that  yt  is not stationary in levels, and the alternative hy-
pothesis is that  ( ) b
2 1 -  is smaller than zero. Second, imagine an AR2 process, which is given by 
y y y
t t t t = + + +
- - b b b e
1 2 1 3 2 . Transforming leads to the „Augmented Dickey Fuller Test“, or 
D D y y y
t t t t = + + - - +
- - b b b b e
1 2 3 1 3 1 1 ( ) . The null hypothesis for nonstationarity is ( ) b b
2 3 1 0 + - = . 
The alternative hypothesis for stationarity is ( ) b b
2 3 1 0 + - < . The ADF-test may be estimated for longer 
AR lags too, and the derivation of the test regression would be similar to that of an AR2. In order to indi-
cate stationarity, the t-values have to be smaller than the critical values of the test statistic which does not 
follow the t-distribution. According tables of significance levels were estimated for instance by Dickey and 
Fuller (1979). Tables for critical values using a bigger number of observations may be found for instance in 
Engle and Yoo (1987, 157) and Charemza and Deadman (1997). We use the exactly calculated critical values 
provided by the software package „EVIEWS“. They are based on the tables of MacKinnon (1991) and are 
presented in the statistical appendix.  
Engle-Granger Procedure 
For the test procedure see Engle and Granger (1987). This two-step estimator gives efficient parameters for 
the I(0) variables, but the estimates of the co-integration relations are not asymptotically efficient. This 
problem is discussed in Engle and Yoo (1987). For an alternative method, using a maximum likelihood ap-
proach, see Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1988). The Engel-Granger Procedure is described 
for bivariate case with variables y1,t and y2,t and n observations. In a first step the parameters of the co-
integrating vector are estimated by OLS. This regression is called the „co-integrating regression“ and is 
given by  y const ay t t t 1, 2 = + + , e ,   t n = 1... . In a second step we use the residuals  e t  of the co-
integrating regression to test for stationarity using DF or ADF tests, leading to  e be m t t t = + -1 ,  
t n = 1... , where the residuals e t  are the result from the first step estimation. Testing for co-integration 
means to test for stationarity of the residuals e t . The null hypothesis of ß=1 corresponds to the null of 
„no existing co-integration“ between  y t 1, and  y t 2, . Rearranging of the equation leads to the already de-
scribed DF and ADF tests. Therefore the null hypothesis is given by (ß-1)=0. Hence, in order to indicate 
co-integration, the t-values have to be smaller than the critical values of the test statistic. The critical val-
ues do not follow the t-statistic and are provided by Charezma and Deadman (1997). The described test 
procedure may simply be extended for more independent variables using the residuals of the estimation of 
a „co-integrating regression“ which is based on more than one explanatory variable.  
Chow-Test for Structural Stability 
The entire range of n observations may be separated in two subsamples (n1 and n2), and the error terms of 
the two subsamples are normally and independently distributed and exhibit identical variance. Estimate the 
residual sum of squares for the whole period (S1) and for the both subsamples (S2 and S3). Then the test 




3 2 3 2 1 ) 2 ( ) )( (
- - - + + - - = k k n n S S S S S F , where k is the number of independ-
ent variables. It follows the F-distribution. The null hypothesis states structural stability, meaning that 
regressions for the two sub-samples are identical. If the F-value exceeds the critical F-value at chosen level 
of significance, it has to be rejected. The description based on Gujarati (1995, 262 ff.).  
Critical Values for the DF- and ADF-Tests 
The following table presents the critical values for the DF and ADF test in the main Text. They are calcu-
lated using the software package „Eviews“ with the exactly number of observations.  
Critical Values for Tests for Stationarity in Levels 
Including  Significance  DF(1)  ADF(2)  ADF(3)  ADF(4)  ADF(5)  ADF(6) 
constant  1%  -3.6852  -3.6959  -3.7076  -3.7204  -3.7343  -3.7497 
constant  5%  -2.9705  -2.9750  -2.9798  -2.9850  -2.9907  -2.9969 
constant  10%  -2.6242  -2.6265  -2.6290  -2.6318  -2.6348  -2.6381 
constant trend  1%  -4.3226  -4.3382  -4.3552  -4.3738  -4.3942  -4.4167 
constant trend  5%  -3.5796  -3.5867  -3.5943  -3.6027  -3.6118  -3.6219 
constant trend  10%  -3.2239  -3.2279  -3.2321  -3.2367  -3.2418  -3.2474 
Critical Values for Tests for Stationarity in Differences 
Including  Significance  DF(1)  ADF(2)  ADF(3)  ADF(4)  ADF(5)  ADF(6) 
constant  1%  -3.6959  -3.7076  -3.7204  -3.7343  -3.7497  -4.4415 
constant  5%  -2.9750  -2.9798  -2.9850  -2.9907  -2.9969  -3.6330 
constant  10%  -2.6265  -2.6290  -2.6318  -2.6348  -2.6381  -3.2535 
constant trend  1%  -4.3382  -4.3552  -4.3738  -4.3942  -4.4167  -4.4415 
constant trend  5%  -3.5867  -3.5943  -3.6027  -3.6118  -3.6219  -3.6330 
constant trend  10%  -3.2279  -3.2321  -3.2367  -3.2418  -3.2474  -3.2535 
(A)DF: (Augmented) Dickey Fuller test. AR coefficients are written in brackets. Yearly data 1967-1995. 
The number of observations is reduced by differencing and the AR-lags.   